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After nearly a decade of talks with Iran, the EU’s
preoccupation with the nuclear issue risks missing the
bigger picture.
by Blog Admin
The European Union has been engaged in talks with Iran over the country’s nuclear
programme for almost a decade. Cornelius Adebahr argues that while the EU has made
some legitimate diplomatic achievements during this period, the focus on Iran’s nuclear
programme has come at the expense of wider issues, such as human rights, energy and
trade.
Today the European Parliament (EP) will hand its prestigious Sakharov Prize f or Freedom
of  Thought to two Iranians: jailed lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh and f ilm-maker under house
arrest Jaf ar Panahi. Both will have to send a representative as the Iranian regime, unsurprisingly, does
not allow them to travel. (It would not even let a scheduled EP delegation see the two activists, which led
to the cancellation of  the trip altogether.) Thus, two days af ter the EU receives the Nobel Peace Prize
f or its own achievements, Europeans can f eel to be on the right side of  history – promoting peace
themselves and supporting the oppressed f ighting f or f reedom. But are things that simple?
At least, there is much more in the picture than just the noble intentions of  the EU. In f act, f or about a
decade now, the EU’s relations with Iran have been marked not by human rights issues (of  which there is
no dearth to address) but by what is simply termed “the nuclear issue”. Ten years ago, in August 2002,
the world learned about a clandestine Iranian nuclear programme through revelations of  an exiled
dissident group. Ever since the f oreign ministers of  France, Germany and the United Kingdom (who have
come to be known as the EU-3) took on a diplomatic init iative with Iran to resolve questions about its
nuclear programme, this matter has remained on the top of  the EU’s f oreign policy agenda. With the
Tehran Declaration of  October 2003 and the Paris Agreement of  November 2004, the EU achieved early
successes, getting Iran to agree to implement the IAEA Additional Protocol  as a voluntary, conf idence-
building measure, and to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activit ies during the course of  the
negotiations. In return, the EU explicit ly recognised Iran’s nuclear rights under the Non-Prolif eration
Treaty and of f ered access to modern nuclear technology provided that Iran would give “satisf actory
assurances” regarding its own programme.
This progress stalled with the accession
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This progress stalled with the accession
of  Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of
Iran and the resumption of  the enrichment
process. The primary objective of  the EU
has always been to drag the United States
to the negotiating table, especially af ter
the 2003 invasion of  Iraq, when a war with
Iran appeared quite likely. For want of  any
substantial progress in the negotiations
since then, the f act that the EU has
managed to get the US to talk to Iran as
part of  the E3+3 (or P5+1, ref erring to the
three af orementioned European states
and the three remaining permanent
members of  the UN Security Council,
China, Russia, and the United States) and
keep together this six-party coalit ion
through various rounds of  increasing UN
sanctions buttressed by additional EU and
US measures, is hailed as a major
diplomatic achievement.
But it ’s not only that the EU f eels it can achieve more by putting its weight behind the nuclear
negotiations than by trying to get the Iranian regime to observe the human rights standards to which it
has signed up. With the case being so high on the agenda of  the two most important global and regional
players – the US and Israel, respectively – the EU simply could not disregard the issue. Plus, if  sitt ing
down to talk helps prevent a war with unf oreseeable consequences f or the whole of  the Middle East
(and, possibly, also resolves the uncertainty about the nuclear programme in question), this is no mean
f eat.
So all is well with the EU’s approach? Well, not quite, because by f ocusing on only one issue, and here
on only one possible outcome (i.e. an Iranian climb-down), the EU f ails to prepare f or dif f erent scenarios.
In this regard, the introductory statement on EU-Iran relations on the homepage of  the EU’s f oreign
service is telling in that it diplomatically highlights the “great potential f or deeper relations” but then only
points to Iran’s nuclear programme as the main hurdle, with the situation of  human rights coming clearly
in second place. The EU then runs the danger of  not seeing the bigger picture of  an Islamic Republic that
is very adept at using the drawn-out high- level negotiation process f or its own interests. Iran has used
the negotiations to advance its international prestige: which other country could claim to be talking to the
f ive permanent members of  the Security Council “eye-to-eye” and at the same time label them as the
“arrogant powers”, with Iran portraying itself  as the voice of  the suppressed countries of  the world?
However the country’s interests are also served by f ocusing the international community’s mind on the
nuclear issue while it engages in a regional power play involving Af ghanistan, Turkey, Syria, the UAE, and
of  course Gaza. It ’s all about an allegedly 1979- inspired ‘Islamic Awakening’ rather than a homegrown
‘Arab Spring’ here.
At least as important, is that the EU misses out on Iran’s domestic developments: i.e. a resurgent
struggle within the regime between the conservatives (around the Supreme Leader), the nationalists (of
President Ahmadinejad), the ones who would call themselves pragmatists (such as f ormer President
Raf sanjani), and of  course the Revolutionary Guards pulling the strings, both polit ical and economic, in
the background. One should also mention the ref ormists around f ormer President Khatami and the
leaders under house arrest of  the 2009 Green Movement, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. If
only they were allowed to f ield a candidate, the ref ormists might even win next June’s Presidential
elections given widespread dissatisf action with the regime (which is precisely why the Guardian Council is
unlikely to make this mistake again). The f act that the EU does not have a delegation in Iran does of
course not help in this regard.
The European Council on Foreign Relations was probably right in grading the EU’s perf ormance on Iran
as ‘B- ’ in its most recent ‘European Foreign Policy Scorecard’. It has shown reasonable unity in the
negotiations, but with the nuclear controversy surpassing all other bilateral and regional issues – energy,
Middle East security, trade and even human rights – the EU remains f ar f rom f ulf illing even its own
potential. It should thus take the Nobel Peace Prize as an inducement to return to its more independent
and imaginative approach f rom previous years and lay out a comprehensive policy f or what is to become
– both internationally and domestically – a decisive year in 2013 f or Iran.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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